Nixon's
Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam
"The Silent Majority" Speech
November 3, 1969
Good evening, my fellow Americans:
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject
of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all
parts of the world--the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the
deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost
confidence in what their Government has told them about our
policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to
support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war
and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer
some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of
you listening to me.
How and why did America get involved in
Vietnam in the first place?
How has this administration changed the
policy of the previous administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations
in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the
war?
What are the prospects for peace?
Now, let me begin by describing the
situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.
--The war had been going on for 4 years.
--31,000 Americans had been killed in
action.
--The training program for the South
Vietnamese was behind schedule.
--540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no
plans to reduce the number.
--No progress had been made at the
negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put
forth a comprehensive peace proposal.
--The war was causing deep division at
home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our
enemies abroad.
In view of these circumstances there were
some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the
immediate withdrawal of all American forces.
From a political standpoint this would have
been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became
involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I
could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action
on him and come out as the Peacemaker. Some put it to me quite
bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war
to become Nixon's war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think
only of the years of my administration and of the next
election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the
next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in
America and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question
before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some
Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not
whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.
The great question is: How can we win
America's peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental
issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in
Vietnam in the first place?
Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the
logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union,
launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South
Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government
of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and
military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in
their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years
ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to
Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson
sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now, many believe that President Johnson’s
decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was
wrong. And many others-I among them-have been strongly
critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now
that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the
precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would
be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United
States and for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate
withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the
massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years
before.
--They then murdered more than 50,000
people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor
camps.
--We saw a prelude of what would happen
in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of
Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a
bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were
clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
--With the sudden collapse of our
support, these atrocities of Hue would become the
nightmare of the entire nation-and particularly for the
million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South
Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.
For the United States, this first defeat in
our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence
in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the
world.
Three American Presidents have recognized
the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had
to be done.
In 1963, President Kennedy, with his
characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: ". . . we want to
see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to
maintain its national independence.
"We believe strongly in that. We are not
going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to
withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of
South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay
there."
President Eisenhower and President Johnson
expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate
withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.
--A nation cannot remain great if it betrays
its allies and lets down its friends.
--Our defeat and humiliation in South
Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the
councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned
their goals of world conquest.
--This would spark violence wherever our
commitments help maintain the peace-in the Middle East, in
Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, this would cost more lives.
It would not bring peace; it would bring
more war.
For these reasons, I rejected the
recommendation that I should end the war by immediately
withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change
American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.
In order to end a war fought on many fronts,
I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.
In a television speech on May 14, in a
speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other
occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
--We have offered the complete withdrawal of
all outside forces within 1 year.
--We have proposed a cease-fire under
international supervision.
--We have offered free elections under
international supervision with the Communists
participating in the organization and conduct of the
elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon
Government has pledged to accept the result of the
elections.
We have not put forth our proposals on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are
willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by
the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable
except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine
their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador
Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40
public meetings.
Hanoi has refused even to discuss our
proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their
terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces
immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the
Government of South Vietnam as we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to
public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January,
that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled
in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public
statements and negotiations I have explored every possible
private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step
of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for
peace-initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because
we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would
be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration to begin
my quest for peace.
--Soon after my election, through an
individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis
with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private
offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's
replies called in effect for our surrender before
negotiations.
--Since the Soviet Union furnishes most
of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of
State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs,
Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have
met on a number of occasions with representatives of the
Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting
meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had
extended discussions directed toward that same end with
representatives of other governments which have diplomatic
relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives
have to date produced results.
--In mid-July, I became convinced that
it was necessary to make a major move to break the
deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this
office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had
known Ho Chi Minh [President, Democratic Republic of
Vietnam] on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I
sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.
I did this outside of the usual
diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity
of making statements for propaganda removed, there might
be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an
end. Let me read from that letter to you now.
"Dear Mr. President:
"I realize that it is difficult to
communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of
war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take
this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to
work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in
Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to
an end can benefit no one-least of all the people of
Vietnam. . . .
"The time has come to move forward at
the conference table toward an early resolution of this
tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded
in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the
brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this
critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward
peace rather than toward conflict and war."
I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August
30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the
public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and
flatly rejected my initiative.
The full text of both letters is being
released to the press.
--In addition to the public meetings
that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with
Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in II private
sessions.--We have taken other significant initiatives
which must remain secret to keep open some channels of
communication which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private,
and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the
bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came
into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence:
No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the
shape of the bargaining table.
Well now, who is at fault?
It has become clear that the obstacle in
negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the
United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.
The obstacle is the other side's absolute
refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a
just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that
all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our
next concession after that one, until it gets everything it
wants.
There can now be no longer any question that
progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to
negotiate, to negotiate seriously.
I realize that this report on our efforts on
the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people,
but the American people are entitled to know the truth-the bad
news as well as the good news where the lives of our young men
are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more
encouraging report on another front.
At the time we launched our search for peace
I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the
war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another
plan to bring peace-a plan which will bring the war to an end
regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.
It is in line with a major shift in U.S.
foreign policy which I described in my press conference at
Guam on July, 25. Let me briefly explain what has been
described as the Nixon Doctrine-a policy which not only will
help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element
of our program to prevent future Vietnams.
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We
are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to
do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been
carried over into our foreign policy.
In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United
States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most
of the men to help the people of those countries defend their
freedom against Communist aggression.
Before any American troops were committed to
Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this
opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private
citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another
nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them
fight the war but not to fight the war for them."
Well, in accordance with this wise counsel,
I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future
American policy toward Asia:
--First, the United States will keep all of
its treaty commitments.
--Second, we shall provide a shield if a
nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied
with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to
our security.
--Third, in cases involving other types
of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic
assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty
commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly
threatened to assume the primary responsibility of
providing the manpower for its defense.
After I announced this policy, I found that
the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South
Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by
Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American
foreign policy.
The defense of freedom is everybody's
business-not just America’s business. And it is particularly
the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened.
In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in
Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the
search for peace.
The policy of the previous administration
not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility
for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not
adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South
Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched
following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under
the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the
training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.
In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed
General Abrams’ orders so that they were consistent with the
objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the
primary mission of our troops is to enable the South
Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the
security of South Vietnam.
Our air operations have been reduced by over
20 percent.
And now we have begun to see the results of
this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.
--After 5 years of Americans going into
Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By
December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from
South Vietnam-including 20 percent of all of our combat
forces.
--The South Vietnamese have continued to
gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take
over combat responsibilities from our American troops.
Two other significant developments have
occurred since this administration took office.
--Enemy infiltration, infiltration which
is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over
the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was
over the same period last year.
--Most important-United States
casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the
lowest point in 3 years.
Let me now turn to our program for the
future.
We have adopted a plan which we have worked
out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete
withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their
replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled
timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not
from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the
rate of American withdrawal can become greater.
I have not and do not intend to announce the
timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for
this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have
indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will
depend on developments on three fronts.
One of these is the progress which can be or
might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed
timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any
incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would
simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.
The other two factors on which we will base
our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and
the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese
forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on
both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when
we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result,
our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when
we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly
demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed
timetable.
We must retain the flexibility to base each
withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time
rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.
Along with this optimistic estimate, I
must-in all candor-leave one note of caution.
If the level of enemy activity significantly
increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.
However, I want the record to be completely
clear on one point.
At the time of the bombing halt just a year
ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an
understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the
bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of
cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no
misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our
withdrawal Program.
We have noted the reduced level of
infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing
our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.
If the level of infiltration or our
casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the
fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the
enemy.
Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to
assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.
If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our
remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take
strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.
This is not a threat. This is a statement of
policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am
making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of
American fighting men wherever they may be.
My fellow Americans, I am sure you can
recognize from what I have said that we really only have two
choices open to us if we want to end this war.
--I can order an immediate, precipitate
withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to
the effects of that action.
--Or we can persist in our search for a
just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or
through continued implementation of our plan for
Vietnamization if necessary-a plan in which we will
withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in
accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese
become strong enough to defend their own freedom.
I have chosen this second course.
It is not the easy way.
It is the right way.
It is a plan which will end the war and
serve the cause of peace-not just in Vietnam but in the
Pacific and in the world.
In speaking of the consequences of a
precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose
confidence in America.
Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence
in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of
relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the
consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and
divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.
We have faced other crisis in our history
and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and
taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness
as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done
when we knew our course was right.
I recognize that some of my fellow citizens
disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and
patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to
how peace should be achieved.
In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw
demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring
the boys home."
Well, one of the strengths of our free
society is that any American has a right to reach that
conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as
President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath
of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be
dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who
try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in
the street.
For almost 200 years, the policy of this
Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders
in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the
people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause,
prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation
has no future as a free society.
And now I would like to address a word, if I
may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly
concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this
war.
I respect your idealism.
I share your concern for peace.
I want peace as much as you do.
There are powerful personal reasons I want
to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to
mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given
their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little
satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters
as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want
more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any
of those letters.
--I want to end the war to save the lives of
those brave young men in Vietnam.
--But I want to end it in a way which
will increase the chance that their younger brothers and
their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam
someplace in the world.
--And I want to end the war for another
reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication
of you, our young people, now too often directed into
bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can
be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life
for all Americans, a better life for all people on this
earth.
I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it
will succeed.
If it does succeed, what the critics say now
won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then
won't matter.
I know it may not be fashionable to speak of
patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is
appropriate to do so on this occasion
Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak
and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in
the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest
nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so
that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and
freedom will be determined by whether the American people have
the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of
free world leadership.
Let historians not record that when America
was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the
other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace
and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the
forces of totalitarianism.
And so tonight-to you, the great silent
majority of my fellow Americans-I ask for your support.
I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency
to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have
initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that
pledge.
The more support I can have from the
American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for
the more divided we are at home, the less likey, the enemy is
to negotiate at Paris.
Let us be united for peace. Let us also be
united against defeat. Because let us understand: North
Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only
Americans can do that.
Fifty years ago, in this room and at this
very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught
the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the
war to end war." His dream for peace after World War I was
shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and
Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.
Tonight I do not tell you that the war in
Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have
initiated a plan which Will end this war in a way that will
bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and
every American President in our history has been dedicated-the
goal of a just and lasting peace.
As President I hold the responsibility for
choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the
Nation along it.
I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet
this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can
command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your
concerns, sustained by your prayers.
Thank you and goodnight.
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