|
Below is the complete text of
the
report by Hans Blix to the United Nations on January 27,
2003. |
The resolution adopted
by the Security Council on Iraq in November last year asks
UNMOVIC and the IAEA to "update" the Council 60 days after
the resumption of inspections. This is today. The updating,
it seems, forms part of an assessment by the Council and its
Members of the results, so far, of the inspections and of
their role as a means to achieve verifiable disarmament in
Iraq.
As this is an open meeting of the Council, it may be
appropriate briefly to provide some background for a better
understanding of where we stand today.
With your permission, I shall do so.
I begin by recalling that inspections as a part of a
disarmament process in Iraq started in 1991, immediately
after the Gulf War. They went on for eight years until
December 1998, when inspectors were withdrawn. Thereafter,
for nearly four years there were no inspections. They were
resumed only at the end of November last year.
While the fundamental aim of inspections in Iraq has always
been to verify disarmament, the successive resolutions
adopted by the Council over the years have varied somewhat
in emphasis and approach.
In 1991, resolution 687, adopted unanimously as a part of
the cease-fire after the Gulf War, had five major elements.
The three first related to disarmament. They called for:
* declarations by Iraq of its programs of weapons of mass
destruction and long range missiles;
* verification of the declarations through UNSCOM and the
IAEA;
* supervision by these organizations of the destruction or
the elimination of proscribed programs and items.
After the completion of the disarmament:
* the Council would have authority to proceed to a lifting
of the sanctions (economic restrictions); and
* the inspecting organizations would move to long-term
ongoing monitoring and verification.
Resolution 687, like the subsequent resolutions I shall
refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but such was often
withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which
decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and
welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its
disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine
acceptance -- not even today -- of the disarmament, which
was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win
the confidence of the world and to live in peace.
As we know, the twin operation "declare and verify," which
was prescribed in resolution 687, too often turned into a
game of "hide and seek." Rather than just verifying
declarations and supporting evidence, the two inspecting
organizations found themselves engaged in efforts to map the
weapons programs and to search for evidence through
inspections, interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers
and intelligence organizations. As a result, the disarmament
phase was not completed in the short time expected.
Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until Iraq
accepted the Oil for Food Program and the gradual
development of that program mitigated the effects of the
sanctions.
The implementation of resolution 687 nevertheless brought
about considerable disarmament results. It has been
recognized that more weapons of mass destruction were
destroyed under this resolution than were destroyed during
the Gulf War: large quantities of chemical weapons were
destroyed under UNSCOM supervision before 1994. While Iraq
claims -- with little evidence -- that it destroyed all
biological weapons unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that
UNSCOM destroyed large biological weapons production
facilities in 1996. The large nuclear infrastructure was
destroyed and the fissionable material was removed from Iraq
by the IAEA.
One of three important questions before us today is how much
might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991; and,
possibly, thereafter; the second question is what, if
anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998,
when the inspectors left; and the third question is how it
can be prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be
produced or procured in the future.
In December 1999 -- after one year without inspections in
Iraq -- resolution 1284 was adopted by the Council with four
abstentions. Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and
following years, it provided Iraq with a somewhat less
ambitious approach: in return for "cooperation in all
respects" for a specified period of time, including progress
in the resolution of "key remaining disarmament tasks," it
opened the possibility, not for the lifting, but the
suspension of sanctions.
For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any
inspections by UNMOVIC. It was only after appeals by the
Secretary-General and Arab States and pressure by the United
States and other Member States, that Iraq declared on 16
September last year that it would again accept inspections
without conditions.
Resolution 1441 was adopted on 8 November last year and
emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate. It
required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and
active. The resolution contained many provisions, which we
welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection
regime. The unanimity by which it was adopted sent a
powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in creating
a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through
inspection.
UNMOVIC shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to
use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable
time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the resolutions
I have cited, it would be followed by monitoring for such
time as the Council feels would be required. The resolutions
also point to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as
the ultimate goal.
As a subsidiary body of the Council, UNMOVIC is fully aware
of and appreciates the close attention, which the Council
devotes to the inspections in Iraq. While today's "updating"
is foreseen in resolution 1441, the Council can and does
call for additional briefings whenever it wishes. One was
held on 19 January and a further such briefing is
tentatively set for 14 February.
I turn now to the key requirement of cooperation and Iraq's
response to it. Cooperation might be said to relate to both
substance and process. It would appear from our experience
so far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide
cooperation on process, notably access. A similar decision
is indispensable to provide cooperation on substance in
order to bring the disarmament task to completion through
the peaceful process of inspection and to bring the
monitoring task on a firm course. An initial minor step
would be to adopt the long-overdue legislation required by
the resolutions.
I shall deal first with cooperation on process.
COOPERATION ON PROCESS
It has regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure
and practical arrangements to pursue inspections and seek
verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built on the
premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is
successful, there must nevertheless be a measure of mutual
confidence from the very beginning in running the operation
of inspection.
Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with
UNMOVIC in this field. The most important point to make is
that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to
inspect and with one exception it has been prompt. We have
further had great help in building up the infrastructure of
our office in Baghdad and the field office in Mosul.
Arrangements and services for our plane and our helicopters
have been good. The environment has been workable.
Our inspections have included universities, military bases,
presidential sites and private residences. Inspections have
also taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on
Christmas Day and New Year's Day. These inspections have
been conducted in the same manner as all other inspections.
We seek to be both effective and correct.
In this updating I am bound, however, to register some
problems. Firstly, relating to two kinds of air operations.
While we now have the technical capability to send a U-2
plane placed at our disposal for aerial imagery and for
surveillance during inspections and have informed Iraq that
we planned to do so, Iraq has refused to guarantee its
safety, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled. As
these conditions went beyond what is stipulated in
resolution 1441 and what was practiced by UNSCOM and Iraq in
the past, we note that Iraq is not so far complying with our
request. I hope this attitude will change.
Another air operation problem -- which was solved during our
recent talks in Baghdad -- concerned the use of helicopters
flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending
helicopters of their own to accompany ours. This would have
raised a safety problem. The matter was solved by an offer
on our part to take the accompanying Iraq minders in our
helicopters to the sites, an arrangement that had been
practiced by UNSCOM in the past.
I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and
harassment. For instance, for some time farfetched
allegations have been made publicly that questions posed by
inspectors were of intelligence character. While I might not
defend every question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq
knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and Iraq
should not say so.
On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in
front of our offices and at inspection sites.
The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to
a mosque was followed by an unwarranted public outburst. The
inspectors went without any UN insignia and were welcomed in
the kind manner that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi
attitude to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were
taken around. They asked perfectly innocent questions and
parted with the invitation to come again.
Shortly thereafter, we receive protests from the Iraqi
authorities about an unannounced inspection and about
questions not relevant to weapons of mass destruction.
Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this
kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or
encouragement from the authorities. We must ask ourselves
what the motives may be for these events. They do not
facilitate an already difficult job, in which we try to be
effective, professional and, at the same time, correct.
Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they can
take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner.
COOPERATION ON SUBSTANCE
The substantive cooperation required relates above all to
the obligation of Iraq to declare all programs of weapons of
mass destruction and either to present items and activities
for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the
conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.
Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 states that this cooperation
shall be "active." It is not enough to open doors.
Inspection is not a game of "catch as catch can." Rather, as
I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of
creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of
trust. Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is
both openness to the inspectors and action to present them
with items to destroy or credible evidence about the absence
of any such items.
THE DECLARATION OF 7 DECEMBER
On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some
12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441
and within the time stipulated by the Security Council. In
the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration
contains a good deal of new material and information
covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.
One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration,
Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit
supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament
issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from
the UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of January 1999 and the
so-called Amorim Report of March 1999 (S/1999/356). These
are questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent
commentators have often cited.
While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current
"unresolved disarmament issues" and "key remaining
disarmament tasks" in response to requirements in resolution
1284, we find the issues listed in the two reports as
unresolved, professionally justified. These reports do not
contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but
nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of
evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks,
which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to
be closed and confidence is to arise.
They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being
brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM. Regrettably,
the 12,000-page declaration, most of which is a reprint of
earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence
that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number.
Even Iraq's letter sent in response to our recent
discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security
Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of
these issues.
I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that
need to be answered and I turn first to the sector of
chemical weapons.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.
Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale,
just a few tons and that the quality was poor and the
product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent
was never weaponized. Iraq said that the small quantity of
agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally
destroyed in the summer of 1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this
account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the
problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been
achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the
documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the
agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than
declared.
There are also indications that the agent was weaponized. In
addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the
fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were
lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally
destroyed by Iraq.
I would now like to turn to the so-called "Air Force
document" that I have discussed with the Council before.
This document was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in
a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken
from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the
expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in
the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has
now provided this document to UNMOVIC.
The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were
dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while
Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during
this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs.
The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the
order of about 1,000 tons. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now
unaccounted for.
The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads
in a bunker at a storage depot 170 kilometers southwest of
Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new
bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there
in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have
had such munitions.
The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq
states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of
some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This
could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged
iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but
rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical
rockets that are unaccounted for.
The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make
more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently
accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq
declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and
had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has
reported that it has found a further four chemical rockets
at a storage depot in Al Taji.
I might further mention that inspectors have found at
another site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a
mustard gas precursor.
Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a
matter, which I reported on 19 December 2002, concerning
equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq
has declared that it had repaired chemical processing
equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and
had installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine
and phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are
conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On
completion, we will decide whether this and other equipment
that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on
previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an
important one.
Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 liters of
this biological warfare agent, which it states it
unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has
provided little evidence for this production and no
convincing evidence for its destruction.
There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax
than it declared, and that at least some of this was
retained after the declared destruction date. It might still
exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under
UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be
produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.
As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq
did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kilograms,
of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as
imported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in
February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration,
Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table
showing this particular import of media was not included.
The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as
the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered.
In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council,
Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that "all imported quantities
of growth media were declared." This is not evidence. I note
that the quantity of media involved would suffice to
produce, for example, about 5,000 liters of concentrated
anthrax.
MISSILES
I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant
questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles
after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a
number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an
anti-ballistic missile defense system during the 1980s. Yet
no technical information has been produced about that
program or data on the consumption of the missiles.
There has been a range of developments in the missile field
during the past four years presented by Iraq as
non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear
understanding of them through inspections and onsite
discussions.
Two projects in particular stand out. They are the
development of a liquid-fueled missile named the Al Samoud
2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both
missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the
permitted range of 150 kilometers, with the Al Samoud 2
being tested to a maximum of 183 kilometers and the Al Fatah
to 161 kilometers. Some of both types of missiles have
already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though
it is stated that they are still undergoing development.
The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier
version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made
despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM
directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than
600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of
engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in
ballistic missiles.
During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on
these two programs. We were told that the final range for
both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range
of 150 kilometers.
These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of
proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150
kilometers are significant, but some further technical
considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion
on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease
flight tests of both missiles.
In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production
infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number
of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed
under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the
production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system
these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors
for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than
150 kilometers.
Also associated with these missiles and related developments
is the import, which has been taking place during the last
few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions,
including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these
is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for
the Al Samoud 2.
Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in
propellants, test instrumentation and guidance and control
systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes.
That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they
were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some
company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by
various resolutions.
Mr. President,
I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that
remain open and that need to be answered if dossiers are to
be closed and confidence is to arise. Which are the means at
the disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have
pointed to some during my presentation of the issues. Let me
be a little more systematic. Our Iraqi counterparts are fond
of saying that there are no proscribed items and if no
evidence is presented to the contrary they should have the
benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent. UNMOVIC, for its
part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and
activities in Iraq, but nor is it -- or I think anyone else
after the inspections between 1991 and 1998 -- presuming the
opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq.
Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and full
transparency may help. Let me be specific.
FIND THE ITEMS AND ACTIVITIES
Information provided by member states tells us about the
movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons
and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall
certainly follow up any credible leads given to us and
report what we might find as well as any denial of access.
So far we have reported on the recent find of a small number
of empty 122 mm warheads for chemical weapons. Iraq declared
that it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more.
Fine. Why not extend the search to other items? Declare what
may be found and destroy it under our supervision?
FIND DOCUMENTS
When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more
evidence, we have all too often met the response that there
are no more documents. All existing relevant documents have
been presented, we are told. All documents relating to the
biological weapons program were destroyed together with the
weapons.
However, Iraq has all the archives of the government and its
various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should
have budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports on
how they have been used. It should also have letters of
credit and bills of lading, reports on production and losses
of material.
In response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of
specific documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was
a ledger of 193 pages which Iraq stated included all imports
from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific
Importation Division, the importing authority for the
biological weapons program. Potentially, it might help to
clear some open issues.
The recent inspection find in the private home of a
scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of
it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium support a
concern that has long existed that documents might be
distributed to the homes of private individuals. This
interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims
that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from
their work places. On our side, we cannot help but think
that the case might not be isolated and that such placements
of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and
to seek to shield documents by placing them in private
homes.
Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be
serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks
to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites.
There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities
or documents. A denial of prompt access to any site would be
a very serious matter.
FIND PERSONS TO GIVE CREDIBLE INFORMATION: A LIST OF
PERSONNEL
When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of
documents is not available, it ought at least to find
individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify
about their experience. Large weapons programs are moved and
managed by people. Interviews with individuals who may have
worked in programs in the past may fill blank spots in our
knowledge and understanding. It could also be useful to
learn that they are now employed in peaceful sectors. These
were the reasons why UNMOVIC asked for a list of such
persons, in accordance with resolution 1441.
Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons
programs as well as their missile programs were provided by
the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of
people associated with those past weapons programs that
UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from
documents and other sources. At my recent meeting in
Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing
the list and some 80 additional names have been provided.
ALLOW INFORMATION THROUGH CREDIBLE INTERVIEWS
In the past, much valuable information came from interviews.
There were also cases in which the interviewee was clearly
intimidated by the presence of and interruption by Iraqi
officials. This was the background of resolution 1441's
provision for a right for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to hold
private interviews "in the mode or location" of our choice,
in Baghdad or even abroad.
To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad
by us. The replies have invariably been that the individual
will only speak at Iraq's monitoring directorate or, at any
rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be
due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence
that they have not said anything that the authorities did
not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the
Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept
interviews "in private," that is to say alone with us.
Despite this, the pattern has not changed. However, we hope
that with further encouragement from the authorities,
knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in
Baghdad or abroad.
UNMOVICS CAPABILITY
Mr. President, I must not conclude this "update" without
some notes on the growing capability of UNMOVIC.
In the past two months, UNMOVIC has built-up its
capabilities in Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from
60 countries. This includes approximately 100 UNMOVIC
inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as security
personnel, communications, translation and interpretation
staff, medical support, and other services at our Baghdad
office and Mosul field office. All serve the United Nations
and report to no one else. Furthermore, our roster of
inspectors will continue to grow as our training program
continues -- even at this moment we have a training course
in session in Vienna. At the end of that course, we shall
have a roster of about 350 qualified experts from which to
draw inspectors.
A team supplied by the Swiss Government is refurbishing our
offices in Baghdad, which had been empty for four years. The
Government of New Zealand has contributed both a medical
team and a communications team. The German Government will
contribute unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and a
group of specialists to operate them for us within Iraq. The
Government of Cyprus has kindly allowed us to set up a Field
Office in Larnaca. All these contributions have been of
assistance in quickly starting up our inspections and
enhancing our capabilities. So has help from the U.N. in New
York and from sister organizations in Baghdad.
In the past two months during which we have built-up our
presence in Iraq, we have conducted about 300 inspections to
more than 230 different sites. Of these, more than 20 were
sites that had not been inspected before. By the end of
December, UNMOVIC began using helicopters both for the
transport of inspectors and for actual inspection work. We
now have eight helicopters. They have already proved
invaluable in helping to "freeze" large sites by observing
the movement of traffic in and around the area.
Setting up a field office in Mosul has facilitated rapid
inspections of sites in northern Iraq. We plan to establish
soon a second field office in the Basra area, where we have
already inspected a number of sites.
Mr. President,
We have now an inspection apparatus that permits us to send
multiple inspection teams every day all over Iraq, by road
or by air. Let me end by simply noting that that capability
which has been built-up in a short time and which is now
operating, is at the disposal of the Security Council.
__
Hans Blix is
Executive
Chairman of Commission to the United Nations on U.N.
Monitoring, Verification and Inspections in Iraq
__
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